Gentrification has become a global phenomenon over the last fifteen years, and has been understood as an increasingly important strategy within neoliberal policy-making.
Introduction
In January 1971, the British novelist, biographer and historian, Gillian Tindall (1971, p. 52) wrote in New Society of 'striking visual change' in 'L' Street in an unspecified part of North West London, possibly Kensal Town (see Tindall, 1977) .
Tindall (p. 52) detailed how 'affluent "new people"' had moved into this '"decaying" street' in the 'last dozen years' taking advantage of 'the theoretical value of the land' (p. 54) and carefully restoring many of the original features of the street's Victorian houses, such as the 'pristine yellow colour' of the bricks. The result, she (p. 55) concluded was that not only 'working class owner-occupiers' but 'incidental tenants' and 'small shop-keepers' were increasingly leaving the streetwhich as she (p. 52) pointed out had previously been inhabited by the 'gentry' and 'semi-gentry' during the mid-nineteenth century. Tindall, however, emphasised how these processes were only incipient: 'London's newly expensive areas are still a long way from showing their recently accrued value to the passing casual observer' (p. 52). She predicted nonetheless:
There are formidable pressures in areas such as these . . . [T] he pressures of money, of space, of people with the money to buy space . . . Inevitably, in spite of superficial appearances, these streets can only become increasingly upper middle class . . . In ten years from now this change will not yet have fully come to pass, but it might in 20 (p.55).
Indeed by the 1990s, the upgrading of previously predominately working-class streets in north London had become ubiquitous. Furthermore, this capture of space and investment in the built environment by users of a progressively higher socio-economic status had spread to other socio-spatial contexts, not just down-at-heel housing. In her 2006 book about Bankside, an inner London area with a recent history as an industrial rather than a residential area, Tindall (2006, p. 232) observed that 'what were originally the "mean streets" and "dark dirty alleys" of waterside Thames are now extremely expensive real-estate, a cosmopolitan ribbon worlds away from the drab hinterlands behind them.'
In December 1991 , Tindall (1991 3) wrote in the Times of India of 'the sturdy and handsome factory buildings now just waiting in Lower Parel for new life and commerce to be breathed into them.' Six months earlier, the Cambridge and Oxford-educated Finance Minister, Dr Manmohan Singh, had ushered in widespread liberalisation reforms of the Indian economy. The private sector was permitted to enter into many areas previously reserved for the public sector, new financial instruments were permitted, the rupee devalued and tariffs lowered. (Davidson and Lees, 2005) , but an emerging and increasingly cited roll-call of work charting gentrification's global spread: from St John's, Antigua (Thomas, 1991) , to Puebla (Jones and Varley, 1999) , Marrakech (Escher et al., 2001) , Istanbul (Potuoglu-Cook, 2006) and São Paolo (Sandler, 2007) .
The global policy-scapes of gentrification
Three inter-related processes have been highlighted to account for why this gentrification map has become much more detailed and wider over the last twenty years. First, gentrification has been seen as a result of gentrification 'cascading' into new territories through new global 'forces'. Atkinson and Bridge (2005, p. 2), for instance, suggest that 'gentrification appears to have migrated centrifugally from the metropoles of North America, Western Europe and Australasia.' Second, gentrification has been viewed as a product of cosmopolitan lifestyles practiced by certain fractions of the transnational capitalist classes (Rofe, 2003) . Third -and the main focus of this paper -gentrification has been understood as an important part of 'neoliberalism'. Neil Smith (2002, p. 440) , for example, argues that gentrification had 'evolved by the 1990s into a crucial urban strategy for city governments in consort with private capital in cities around the world'.
In these attempts to account for the global spread of gentrification, there has been a tendency to treat globalisation, cosmopolitanism or neoliberalism as backdrops to gentrification. In part, this has been a product of gentrification researchers failing to engage fully with work outside their own sub-discipline. As Butler and Lees (2007: 4) posit, 'the globalization literature and the gentrification literature have, to date, paid little attention to each other' while Lees (2007, p. 230) similarly suggests that 'writings on cosmopolitanism' need to be brought into gentrification work. There are likewise important yet unexplored links between greater state intervention in gentrification over the last decade and Peck and Tickell's (2002) identification of a shift from 'roll-back'
to 'roll-out' neoliberal policy-making. In the creation of new privatised cultural landscapes and the generation of new circuits of capital accumulation, gentrification has become a key urban arena in the development of neoliberal policies (Brenner and Theodore, 2005; Hackworth, 2007) .
In order to better conceive gentrification as interconnected and interdependent with wider processes such as neoliberalism, there needs to be greater emphasis on the actors who shape and legitimize gentrification, and how their ideas and policies travel.
Gentrification researchers need to ask who is responsible for the creation of what Davidson and Lees (2005, p. 1167 ) depict as a 'gentrification blueprint' that is 'being mass-produced, mass-marketed, and mass-consumed around the world'. This parallels recent attempts to conceive neoliberalism as a migratory set of practices rather than an 'atmospheric' system (Ong, 2007) . Wendy Larner (2003, p. 510) , for instance, has called for a 'more careful tracing of the intellectual, policy and practitioner networks that underpin the global expansion of neoliberal ideas, and their subsequent manifestation in government policies and programmes'.
There has been no mapping, for example, of the significant role for new urban-focused think-tanks in the global spread of policies and practices of gentrification. With close connections to governmental, property and media elites, these have helped push strategies of gentrification onto and up policy agendas -in a similar manner to the role of pro-market think-tanks in helping distil, diffuse and normalise ideas of 'neoliberal' governance (Desai, 1994 (Smith, 2001 ) and globally-mobile architects such as Lord Richard Rogers advertising notions of an 'urban renaissance' (Lees, 2003) . Another network that has barely been acknowledged is the global-scape of gentrification research itself (Allen, 2008) . The growth of the gentrification map has also been the result of its theoretical and conceptual language travelling from its 'core' centres of discursive production (Clark, 2005) . At a transnational scale, this first occurred with the circulation of the term from its origins in London to New York during the 1970s (Smith, 2006, p. 194 
Gentrification in a world of cities
Another associated problematic tendency in attempts at accounting for new globalised geographies of gentrification is to neglect the diversity of the process -despite its increasing ubiquity within contemporary urbanism. This is a criticism often aimed at Neil Smith (2002) and his notion of 'gentrification generalised'. Smith (2002, p. 440) , nevertheless, emphasises how 'gentrification has occurred in markedly different ways' so that 'insofar as it is an expression of larger social, economic and political relations, gentrification in any particular city will express the particularities of the place in the making of its urban space'. Yet beyond cursory references to Mexico City and Mumbai, and his long-standing work on New York, Smith (2002) fails to provide any in-depth place-specific accounts in his overview of gentrification as a global strategy.
Such analysis is required to investigate how the global spread of gentrification -like the extension of market rule through neoliberalism -operates through different urban economic bases, social hierarchies, cultural histories and institutional frameworks (Wilson, 2004) . This is why Van Weesep (1994, p. 80) urges that policy-orientated gentrification research is 'better served by the analysis of concrete problems than by general descriptions of broad trends which disregard many of their manifestations and effects.'
One important way of investigating the global spread of gentrification -while remaining sensitive to its different geographically and historically-specific manifestations and effects -is to adopt a comparative perspective. Such a perspective already has a rich and productive intellectual tradition within gentrification research, arguably more so than in other strands of urban literature. Analytical frameworks have ranged from trans-Atlantic comparisons (Carpenter and Lees, 1995; Van Criekingen and Decroly, 2003) , trans-continental comparisons (Slater, 2004) , inter-urban national comparisons (Ley, 1996) to intra-urban comparative perspectives (Butler and Robson, 2003; Hackworth, 2002) .
In a context of new interlinked forms of globalised gentrification and neoliberal urban policy, this moving between different cities and urban areas through a comparative perspective assumes even greater importance. In particular, it helps complicate an often straightforward mapping of the global spread of gentrification onto a so-called 'third- Recent attempts at setting an agenda for future critical gentrification work have been notable for their complete lack of reference to cities outside the West (e.g. Slater, 2006; Lees, 2007) . Conference sessions on 'global' gentrification have also been skewed to Anglo-American case-studies. This is despite contemporary gentrification processes arguably being at their sharpest in the global 'South'. As Neil Smith (2008: p. 196) comments, gentrification is 'happening on a more massive scale in Shanghai or
Mumbai . . . than in the older post-industrializing cities of Europe, North America and
This paper will address this absence of in-depth comparative gentrification research involving urban areas from beyond the global 'North' by focusing on London and
Mumbai. Although contrasted in art and architectural exhibitions (Blazwick, 2001; Burdett, 2006) , there has been no systematic comparison of these two cities within urban studies. This is despite there being important similarities not only in their shared histories of British colonialism but in their economic, political and socio-spatial restructuring over the last thirty years. Formal employment in London and Mumbai's once thriving manufacturing sectors has sharply declined with an accompanying dramatic growth in both cities' financial and business services sectors (Graham and Spence, 1995; Banerjee-Guha, 2002) . This has been accompanied by a raft of deregulatory and liberalisation reforms, and the growth of new corporate-governmental alliances. London has subsequently become, as Peck and Tickell (2007, p. 35) argue, 'a city with a distinctive role in shaping the ideological topography of the market revolution' while Mumbai has similarly become a key site in the creation and promotion of neoliberal South Asia (Patel, 2004) . Furthermore -and crucial to this paper's comparative focus -this economic and political restructuring has been manifest and bolstered by major socio-spatial transformations of both cities' central districts over the past decade.
In order to compare gentrification and public policy between London and Mumbai at more than a general level, two areas will be detailed: Bankside and Lower Parel.
Bankside is situated on the south bank of the River Thames, directly opposite the City of London, while Lower Parel is located at the centre of Mumbai's island peninsular, a few miles north of the city's main financial district. They have been chosen not only because they are both centrally located areas of comparable size, but because of their important similarities and interconnections in relation to recent processes of gentrification. Until the 1980s, although Bankside possessed a more diverse economic base, both areas were associated with polluted urban landscapes and industrialisation.
Without a large stock of devalued nineteenth-century houses, they were not gentrified in the classic form outlined by Ruth Glass (1964) . Nevertheless, state-sanctioned gentrification processes have occurred in the two areas over the last two decades with many old industrial buildings converted into offices and several luxury residential developments constructed on previously derelict land.
The first section will explore 'proto-gentrification' trajectories prior to the 1990s. This will provide important historical contexts for the second section which will outline different ways that the state has directly or indirectly intervened in the gentrification of these two areas over the last twenty years. In the third section, the impacts of Bankside and Lower Parel's gentrification on less affluent users of these areas will be compared and contrasted. Throughout, the two areas will be placed against each other within the narrative rather than considered in separate sections. This will help track particular patterns and practices within the recent global spread of gentrification, and help make connections between these two institutionally-specific examples and more generalised political discourses and ideologies (Peck, 2004) . The paper draws upon semi-structured and machinery, and providing managerial staff (Leadbeater, 1993, p. 61) . The construction of the mills also meant that workers, the majority of whom lived within fifteen minutes walk of their workplace, established a thriving new social milieu of tenements, neighbourhoods and markets (Chandavarkar, 1994, p. 169 ).
Yet, by the 1940s there were growing calls for the 'decongestion' of these two centrally-located industrial areas. Grace Golden (1951, p. 14) , writing in 1950, forecast
Bankside's 'obvious destiny' was to lose its 'alleyways and wharfs' and acquire 'a Parel's mills and for remaking the accompanying densely populated neighbourhoods into 'good' middle-class localities (Dwivedi and Mehrotra, 1995, p. 299) . It was argued, for instance, that the total removal of the textile industry from central Bombay would 'mean an all round subsidence of tension, and a welcome reduction of population' (Modi, 1950, p. 410) . Greater London Development Plan (Hirons, 1973 Parel's mill-lands. These were no longer located on the edge of Bombay, as they were when first established in the late nineteenth century, but had become strategically situated at the very centre of a rapidly growing city on a geographically-constricted (Nicholson, 1988) .
Gentrification as an urban strategy in London and Mumbai
The last fifteen years, however, have witnessed the dramatic transformation of both areas. In Bankside, several large residential and commercial developments by consumption practices and property speculation (Hamnett, 2003) . Lower Parel similarly has been seen as a major beneficiary of liberalisation reforms of the Indian economy in 1991, and the spatialised production of new middle-class urban identities (Fernandes, 2006) . Situated at the heart of Mumbai's Island City, Lower Parel's land prices quadrupled from 1000 Rupees per sq.ft. in 1988 to 4000 Rupees per sq.ft. in 1993, and by the height of Mumbai's post-liberalisation real estate spiral during the mid-1990s, the area's former mill-lands were estimated to be worth $7.5 billion (Manchanda, 1993; D'Monte, 2001, p. 74 ).
Yet the gentrification of Bankside and Lower Parel can not simply be attributed to new flows of global capital, and the emergence of new middle-class groups. Crucially, it also has to be assessed with respect to the role of public policy acting within the specific historical and geographical contexts of the two areas. Firstly, there have been concerted, ongoing and often crude efforts by commercial and political elites to curtail union power and 'roll-back' oppositional movements to gentrification. In Lower Parel, union strength has been undermined by commercial elites' nurturing of a political organisation unique to postcolonial Mumbai, the Shiv Sena (Hansen, 2001 ).
Industrialists and mill-owners gave liberally to the embryonic organisation, employing Shiv Sena goondas (thugs) in their Bombay factories to intimidate communist unions during the late 1960s and 1970s (Katzenstein, 1978, footnote 18, p. 240) . This alliance proved highly successful, with radical left-wing unions declining from the 1960s (Sherlock, 1996) . In turn, patronage from local capitalists greatly assisted Shiv Sena's establishment as a major political force (Gupta, 1982) . Additionally, following -and It is also the consequence of how, in the interregnum after the GLC was abolished, inner London's industrial base all but disintegrated. Livingstone has therefore been restricted in formulating many of his policies to strategies that are reliant on London's continued business growth and planning gains from property developers in areas such as Bankside (McNeill, 2002; Harris, 2008) .
Urban political discourse in Mumbai has also increasingly been subsumed to a globalised set of economic interests, paralleling new ideological agendas at the national level (Shastri, 1997) . Planners, for example, following the precedent set by There has been a noticeable increase in enquiries relating to residential and leisure uses in the Bankside area over recent months, several of whom have mentioned the Tate in background to their plans. In addition, other developments which had appeared speculative now seem to be moving towards implementation. Finally, developers who had been involved in schemes in this area have found their success in letting/selling space (particularly for residential uses) so marked that they are now actively seeking other sites in the same area for further development. [Tate Archives: TG 12/7/1/7]
Although framed more widely than simply as a way of 'regenerating' Bankside by encouraging new property speculation, the public funding of the Tate Gallery cannot be divorced from attempts at consolidating the gentrification of the area. As Paul Barker (1999, p. 14) comments, the Tate ensured that Bankside became 'a chirpy monument to the economics of the market.' Similarly, Southwark Council commissioned several innovative architectural practices to create a series of designrich improvements to Bankside's street fabric, furniture and signs as part of a £3.65 million design initiative in 1999 (Bateson, 1999 (Jindal, 2000) . In February 1996, the Maharashtra state government did, however, appoint a study group under the chairmanship of the internationally trained and celebrated Indian architect Charles
Correa to investigate how best to develop 57 hectares of publicly-owned mill-lands (Correa, 1996) . Proposals included the transformation of congested streets into covered shopping arcades and pedestrian malls (ibid., figure 22 ), the widening and lining with trees of principal roads to create 'leafy boulevards' (ibid., figure 5 ), and the conversion of the thirty-metre high, 75 year old chimney at India United Mills into a 'heritage landmark' (p. 9). Although never formally published, Correa's vision for Lower Parel as a consumption-filled district has been taken up, albeit in a more piecemeal fashion, by several private mill-owners during the last ten years. In particular, the opening of a bowling alley, night-club and shopping centre in Phoenix Mills during the late 1990s
has played an important role in signalling and asserting Lower Parel's new gentrified cultural landscape (Figure 1 ).
Yet, rather than trying to encourage gentrification through improvements to the cultural landscape, politicians in Lower Parel have often colluded directly with mill-owner and builders in the redevelopment of real estate and the manipulation of planning regulations and legal norms protecting industry and textile workers (Pinto and Fernandes, 1996) . Sharad Pawar of the National Congress Party, for instance, who as Chief Minister of Maharashtra was responsible for the introduction of new Development Control rules in 1991, allegedly leased the land where Phoenix's mill canteen once stood to build a car repair centre (Dhawan, 2002) . In 2005, the 4.9 acre Kohinoor Mills No 3, just to the north of Lower Parel, was sold for Rs.421 crores ($100 million) to a consortium that included the son of Manohar Joshi, the former member of parliament for Lower Parel, and the nephew of Bal Thackeray, leader of Shiv Sena (Katakam, 2005) . As well as officially acknowledged forms of state intervention, a 'shadow state' has operated in Mumbai where the boundaries between different centres of political authority and legitimacy have become extensively blurred (Hansen, 2005) .
Globalised gentrification and fractured cities
Bankside and Lower Parel's dramatic transformation over the last fifteen years demonstrates how contemporary gentrification processes are actively negotiated through various forms of public policy. Political and commercial elites -often operating in tandem -have weakened the position of anti-gentrification groups and planning regulations in these two areas, emphasised the primacy of global capital in setting political agendas for London and Mumbai, and developed a variety of strategies to attract new property investment. These efforts have been framed through wider ideologies of neoliberalism and new discourses of the 'global city' which have enabled long-held aspirations to gentrify Bankside and Lower Parel to be met.
Nevertheless, as well as considering how public policy has mediated Lower Parel and Bankside's gentrification, it is also crucial to consider the resultant effects on more marginalised users of the two areas. This is something that has been notably lacking from gentrification research (and policy-making) in recent years (Slater, 2006) . It is only by considering the range of socio-spatial, political and cultural impacts that practical responses to gentrification can be assessed and formulated (Paton, 2007) .
Although the gentrification of Lower Parel and Bankside has been a product of similar planning and economic histories over the last sixty years and the rise of new globalised notions of contemporary urbanism, Lower Parel's gentrification has involved a far greater intensification of socio-spatial inequality than Bankside. This sharper-edged gentrification reveals significant political and socio-cultural differences between the two case-studies and helps highlight several aspects to Bankside's transformation which might otherwise not be so apparent.
The key defining impact of gentrification, albeit one that is often hard to quantify, is residential displacement. In Lower Parel, many former mill-workers and their families have moved to townships and 'shanty' communities on the outskirts of the city, often as a result of the shift of textile production to suburban sweatshops (Bhowmik and More, 2001 ). This is evidenced by how, according to illegitimate property rights (Rajagopal, 2004) . One business executive working in an office on former mill-land comments:
Even the exteriors on the main arteries are getting, or they're looking cleaner. And a lot of the roadside pavement dwellers are beginning to move away, or they've been cleared away, or slum rehabilitation projects have taken them away, and it's a beautiful wide road (interview, 2003) .
As Whitehead and More (2007, p. 2433) (Rajan, 2007) .
Although the material realities of social injustice have been experienced very differently in Bankside, there has been a similar lack of democratic accountability.
Receiving almost £60 million of public funding, it is the Tate's unelected board of trustees, rather than local elected representatives which has set much of the agenda for Bankside's transformation. Their primary emphasis on establishing an internationallyheralded cultural quarter has led to a neglect of many of the social needs of the area's low-income population. One long-term local resident angrily comments:
I mean we just have to beg for money to improve local amenities here and they still talk about taking amenities away from us like the Borough Community Centre . . . There's all this kind of affluent smart signs, but there is no support for the local community, there's no way any of these things are ameliorated and if they were people would be a lot happier (interview, 2004) .
Recent socio-economic data indicates that Bankside's traditionally high levels of deprivation and social exclusion remain. At the turn of the millennium, Cathedral
Ward, encompassing most of Bankside, was still amongst the 7% most deprived wards in England. Parel's gentrification has entailed an active disavowal of the area's history, vernacular and artefacts (Harris, 2005) . As a former mill-worker explained:
Two parallel cultures are coming up [in Lower Parel] . One culture is of the mill workers, they are poor, they have no work, they are unorganised also. The other culture is of the malls, shopping malls, towers, bowling companies and other things (interview, 2002) . (Sainath, 1994; Masselos, 1995) . The rupturing of Lower Parel's social fabric through gentrification processes has been an important part of the emergence of Mumbai as a more malignant city, signalling not just displacement, but systematic dispossession and marginalisation.
Most of Lower

Conclusions
In It is necessary, however, to maintain a critical approach to understandings of a generalised global strategy of contemporary gentrification. These can lead to the assumption that gentrification has simply been projected out from 'heartland' cities such as London and adapted and reshaped in cities such as Mumbai (Robinson, 2004) .
The practical politics of gentrification need to be understood as contingently realised across different global contexts. Although Lower Parel's gentrification has been framed by transnational actors and urban imaginaries, it has also been the product of the whims and wherefores of a powerful nexus of politicians, builders and developers exploiting and profiting from Mumbai's poorly implemented and monitored land-use policies and planning controls.
Moreover, in considering how gentrification has become 'generalised' across cities in both the global North and South, it is important to recognise how convergence processes have operated in a two-way direction. Rather than exporting Eurocentric understandings of gentrification, there is a need to learn from the new sharp-edged forms and processes of socio-spatial upgrading in previously 'peripheral' cities such as Mumbai. In this way, some of the more parochial assumptions, practices and language of gentrification research can be 'provincialised' and re-examined (Chakrabarty, 2000) .
The 'social tectonics' invoked by Butler and Robson (2003) 'boomerang' effect on the institutions, apparatuses and techniques of power in the West (Rabinow, 1989; Harvey, 2005) .
Recent debates within the gentrification literature about the role of the state in encouraging more 'socially mixed' urban communities can, in particular, learn from
Mumbai. From the mid-1990s, the Maharashtrian state government have introduced new slum redevelopment strategies in which property companies have been invited to demolish slums and redevelop land at a higher density. It is assumed that the inflated prices of Mumbai's real estate market can be used to cross-subsidise housing for the original slum-dwellers in new medium-rise apartment blocks (Mukhija, 2003) . This strategy has been particularly prominent in the redevelopment of Dharavi, dubbed Asia's largest slum, which is located on the opposite bank of the Mithi River from Mumbai's new financial hub, the Bandra-Kurla complex. For US-based architect Mukesh Mehta, the state government's consultant for this scheme, by mixing people together from different social strata, a process of what he calls 'reverse-gentrification' will occur (quoted in D'Souza, 2007). However, as with similar policies devised in the UK and US, concerns have been raised that people from higher socio-economic groups will eventually displace the original residents of these areas, especially as there has been a failure to acknowledge the integral and highly dynamic social, economic and political practices in which previous 'slum' housing environments were produced (Sharma, 2000) . There are also important parallels between the role of NGOs such as SPARC in slum upgradation projects such as Dharavi and notions of 'managing' gentrification (Whitehead and More, 2007) .
The proposed redevelopment of Dharavi will set an important precedent for cities across India and the global 'South' (Patel and Arputham, 2008 ). Yet Mumbai has not been included so far in discussions of gentrification and 'social mix'. Without recognising these wider contexts for the role of public policy in gentrification, there remains a danger that in accounting for the global spread of gentrification, certain cities are isolated into separate analytical categories or located on older developmental continuums. Gillian Tindall (1979, p. 671) , for example, argued in 1979 that:
London too once had its beggars, its abandoned waifs, its lepers, its cholera. In cities like Bombay we are, in one sense, simply seeing a society at an earlier stage of development than our own.
By emphasising how similar social, economic and institutional issues and networks impact contemporary cities across the world, regardless of levels of national economic development, gentrification research has an important role to play in creating new more cosmopolitan frameworks for urban studies (Robinson, 2006 
